| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| FFmpeg through 8.1.2, fixed in commit aafb5c6, contains a signed integer overflow vulnerability in the MACE6 audio decoder that allows attackers to corrupt heap memory by supplying a crafted CAF file with a malicious bytes_per_packet value. Attackers can craft a CAF file with oversized bytes_per_packet and frames_per_packet values in the desc chunk to trigger an integer overflow in mace_decode_frame() during output sample count computation, resulting in an undersized buffer allocation and heap out-of-bounds write that could enable code execution. |
| An integer overflow when calculating physical offsets for sparse PMRs may result in 32-bit truncation of address computations for PMRs larger than 4 GB. This can lead to incorrect GPU MMU mappings and may allow a non-privileged user to trigger access to unintended physical memory, resulting in memory corruption or information disclosure. |
| Integer Overflow or Wraparound vulnerability in Apache Thrift C++, c_glib, Go, netstd, Delphi and Haxe bindings.
This issue affects Apache Thrift: before 0.24.0.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 0.24.0, which fixes the issue. |
| Storable versions before 3.41 for Perl have a signed integer overflow when deserializing a crafted SX_HOOK record.
retrieve_hook_common reads a signed 32-bit item count from an SX_HOOK record and calls av_extend with that count plus one. A count of I32_MAX wraps the addition to a negative value.
A crafted blob passed to thaw or retrieve triggers the overflow; av_extend receives the negative count and dies with a panic, terminating the deserialization. |
| diff3 tool from GNU diffutils is vulnerable to a heap‑based buffer overflow due to multiple signed integer overflows in line‑mapping calculations. Incorrect arithmetic in mapping line ranges can result in corrupted values being used for memory allocation and loop bounds.
When processing crafted diff output, these overflows may cause the application to allocate insufficient memory and subsequently perform out‑of‑bounds writes during internal processing.
An attacker who can control the output of the diff program used by diff3 (e.g. via --diff-program pointing to a malicious script) can trigger out-of-bounds writes, resulting in a crash and potentially remote code execution depending on the environment.
This issue has been fixed in commit 9ff04d5b84743e331e80b589335a52c5480d1815
NOTE:
The project maintainers claim that this is not a security issue. They state that the worst outcome this issue can cause is a crash of diff and that it cannot be used to escalate privileges. |
| cJSON library is vulnerable to an integer overflow in the print_string_ptr() function in cJSON.c on 32-bit platforms. The escape_characters counter, a 32-bit size_t, can wrap around when processing strings containing approximately 858,993,460 or more control characters, causing the output buffer to be allocated based on an underestimated length. When cJSON_PrintBuffered() is used with a pre-allocated buffer, the subsequent write loop overflows the heap allocation. An attacker supplying a crafted JSON string to an application using cJSON on a 32-bit platform can cause a heap buffer overflow, potentially leading to remote code execution, information disclosure, or denial of service.
Because project creator contact attempts were unsuccessful, the vulnerability has only been confirmed in version 1.7.19 but may also affect other versions. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse: avoid 32-bit prune notification count wrap
FUSE_NOTIFY_PRUNE validates the nodeid payload length with:
size - sizeof(outarg) != outarg.count * sizeof(u64)
On 32-bit kernels, size_t is also 32 bits, so the daemon-controlled
count multiplication can wrap. A prune notification with count
0x20000000 and no nodeid payload passes the check, enters the copy
loop, and asks the device copy path to read nodeids that are not
present in the userspace write buffer. In QEMU this reaches the
fuse_copy_fill() BUG_ON(!err) path.
Validate the payload length with array_size() instead. That accepts
exactly the same valid messages, but avoids wrapping arithmetic before
the copy loop consumes the count. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: guest_memfd: Treat memslot binding offset+size as unsigned values
When binding a memslot to a guest_memfd file, treat the offset and size as
unsigned values to fix a bug where the sum of the two can result in a false
negative when checking for overflow against the size of the file. Passing
unsigned values also avoids relying on somewhat obscure checks in other
flows for safety, and tracks the offset and size as they are intended to be
tracked, as unsigned values.
On 64-bit kernels, the number of pages a memslot contains and thus the size
(and offset) of its guest_memfd binding are unsigned 64-bit values. Taking
the offset+size as an loff_t instead of a uoff_t inadvertently converts
the unsigned value to a signed value if the offset and/or size is massive.
Locally storing the offset and size as signed values is benign in and of
itself (though even that is *extremely* difficult to discern), but
operating on their sum is not.
For the offset, KVM explicitly checks against a negative value, which might
seem like a bug as KVM could incorrectly reject a legitimate binding, but
that's not actually the case as KVM_CREATE_GUEST_MEMFD takes a signed value
for its size, i.e. a would-be-negative offset is also greater than the
maximum possible size of any guest_memfd file.
Regarding the size, while KVM lacks an explicit check for a negative value,
i.e. seemingly has a flawed overflow check, KVM restricts the number of
pages in a single memslot to the largest positive signed 32-bit value:
if (id < KVM_USER_MEM_SLOTS &&
(mem->memory_size >> PAGE_SHIFT) > KVM_MEM_MAX_NR_PAGES)
return -EINVAL;
and so that maximum "size" will ever be is 0x7fffffff000.
The sum of the two is, however, problematic. While the size is restricted
by KVM's memslot logic, the offset is not, i.e. the offset is completely
unchecked until the "offset + size > i_size_read(inode)" check. If the
offset is the (nearly) largest possible _positive_ value, then adding size
to the offset can result in a signed, negative 64-bit value. When compared
against the size of the file (guaranteed to be positive), the negative sum
is always smaller, and KVM incorrectly allows the absurd offset.
Opportunistically add missing includes in kvm_mm.h (instead of relying on
its parents). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ipv4: bound TCP reordering sysctl writes and MTU probe sizes
Reject invalid `net.ipv4.tcp_reordering` values before they reach TCP
socket state. The sysctl is stored as an `int` but copied into the
`u32` `tp->reordering` field for new sockets, so negative writes wrap
to large values.
With `tcp_mtu_probing=2`, the wrapped value can overflow the
`tcp_mtu_probe()` size calculation and drive the MTU probing path into
an out-of-bounds read. Route `tcp_reordering` writes through
`proc_dointvec_minmax()` and require it to be at least 1. Also require
`tcp_max_reordering` to be at least 1 so the configured maximum cannot
become negative either.
When registering the table for a non-init network namespace, relocate
`extra2` pointers that refer into `init_net.ipv4` so the
`tcp_reordering` upper bound follows that namespace's
`tcp_max_reordering`.
Harden `tcp_mtu_probe()` itself by computing `size_needed` as `u64`.
This keeps the send queue and window checks from being bypassed through
signed integer overflow. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fpga: dfl-afu: validate DMA mapping length in afu_dma_map_region()
afu_ioctl_dma_map() accepts a 64-bit length from userspace via
DFL_FPGA_PORT_DMA_MAP ioctl without an upper bound check. The value
is passed to afu_dma_pin_pages() where npages is derived as
length >> PAGE_SHIFT and passed to pin_user_pages_fast() which takes
int nr_pages, causing implicit truncation if length is very large.
Validate map.length at the ioctl entry point before calling
afu_dma_map_region(), rejecting values whose page count exceeds
INT_MAX. |
| Dell PowerProtect Data Domain, versions 7.7.1.0 through 8.7, LTS2026 release version 8.6.1.0 through 8.6.1.10, LTS2025 release version 8.3.1.0 through 8.3.1.30, LTS2024 release versions 7.13.1.0 through 7.13.1.70 contain an Integer overflow or wraparound vulnerability. An unauthenticated attacker with remote access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to denial of service. |
| Successful
exploitation of the integer overflow vulnerability could allow an attacker to
achieve system-level access to the affected software. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: scsi_transport_fc: Widen FPIN pname walker counter to u32
An adjacent Fibre Channel fabric actor that can deliver an FPIN ELS
frame to an lpfc or qla2xxx Linux initiator can trigger a non-return in
the generic FC transport. This is not a local userspace or IP network
path; the attacker must be able to inject fabric traffic, for example as
a compromised switch or fabric controller, or as a same-zone N_Port on a
fabric that permits source spoofing.
The Link-Integrity and Peer-Congestion FPIN walkers used a u8 loop
counter against the 32-bit on-wire pname_count field, and did not bound
pname_count by the descriptor body already validated by the TLV walker.
A pname_count of 256 therefore wraps the counter and keeps the loop
condition true indefinitely.
Factor the shared pname_list[] walk into one helper, widen the counter
to u32, and clamp pname_count against the entries that fit in the
descriptor body before iterating. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: don't wrap around quota ids in dqiterate
LOLLM noticed that q_id is an unsigned 32-bit variable. If it happens
to be set to XFS_DQ_ID_MAX due to a filesystem that actually has a dquot
for ID_MAX, then this addition will truncate to zero and the iteration
starts over. Fix this by casting to u64. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommufd: Set upper bounds on cache invalidation entry_num and entry_len
iommufd_hwpt_invalidate() takes a user-controlled entry_num and entry_len,
each bounded only by U32_MAX. An entry_len beyond the kernel's struct size
makes the copy helper verify the extra bytes are zero, scanning that excess
in one uninterruptible pass; a multi-gigabyte value over zeroed user memory
trips the soft-lockup watchdog.
A large entry_num is the other half, driving the backend invalidation loop
with no reschedule. The VT-d nested handler, for one, copies each entry and
flushes caches per iteration, pinning the CPU on a non-preemptible kernel.
Cap both in the ioctl. entry_len is held under PAGE_SIZE, above any request
struct, and entry_num under 1 << 19, the order of a hardware invalidation
queue and well beyond any real batch, bounding the per-call loop length. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/damon/ops-common: handle extreme intervals in damon_hot_score()
Fix three issues in damon_hot_score() that comes from wrong handling of
extreme (zero or too high) monitoring intervals user setup.
When the user sets sampling interval zero, damon_max_nr_accesses(), which
is called from damon_hot_score(), causes a divide-by-zero. Needless to
say, it is a problem.
When the user sets the aggregation interval zero, the function returns
zero. It is wrong, since the real maximum nr_acceses in the setup should
be one. Worse yet, it can cause another divide-by-zero from its caller,
damon_hot_score(), since it uses damon_max_nr_accesses() return value as a
denominator.
When the user sets the aggregation interval very high, damon_hot_score()
could return a value out of [0, DAMOS_MAX_SCORE] range. Since the return
value is used as an index to the regions_score_histogram array, which is
DAMOS_MAX_SCORE+1 size, it causes out of bounds array access.
The issues can be relatively easily reproduced like below. The sysfs
write permission is required, though.
# ./damo start --damos_action lru_prio --damos_quota_space 100M \
--damos_quota_interval 1s
# cd /sys/kernel/mm/damon/admin/kdamonds/0
# echo 0 > contexts/0/monitoring_attrs/intervals/sample_us
# echo 0 > contexts/0/monitoring_attrs/intervals/aggr_us
# echo commit > state
# dmesg
[...]
[ 131.329762] Oops: divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[...]
[ 131.336089] RIP: 0010:damon_hot_score+0x27/0xd0
[...]
Fix the divide-by-zero intervals problems by explicitly handling the zero
intervals in damon_max_nr_accesses(). Fix the out-of-bound array access
by applying [0, DAMOS_MAX_SCORE] bounds before returning from
damon_hot_score().
The issue was discovered [1] by Sashiko. |
| An issue in MikroTIk (SIA Mikrotikls, Latvia) RouterOS 7.21.x before v.7.21.4 and 7.22.x before v.7.22.2 allows a remote attacker to cause a denial of service via the unflatten() function in libumsg.so. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: rpl: fix hdrlen overflow in ipv6_rpl_srh_decompress()
ipv6_rpl_srh_decompress() computes:
outhdr->hdrlen = (((n + 1) * sizeof(struct in6_addr)) >> 3);
hdrlen is __u8. For n >= 127 the result exceeds 255 and silently
truncates. With n=127 (cmpri=15, cmpre=15, pad=0, hdrlen=16):
(128 * 16) >> 3 = 256, truncated to 0 as __u8
The caller in ipv6_rpl_srh_rcv() then places the compressed header
at buf + ((ohdr->hdrlen + 1) << 3). With hdrlen=0 this is buf + 8,
but the decompressed region occupies buf[0..2055] (8-byte header
plus 128 full addresses). The compressed header overlaps the
decompressed data, and ipv6_rpl_srh_compress() writes into this
overlap, corrupting the routing header of the forwarded packet.
The existing guard at exthdrs.c:546 checks (n + 1) > 255, which
prevents n+1 from overflowing unsigned char (the segments_left
field), but does not prevent the computed hdrlen from overflowing
__u8. n=127 passes because 128 <= 255, yet hdrlen=256 does not
fit.
Tighten the bound to (n + 1) > 127. This caps n at 126, giving
hdrlen = (127 * 16) >> 3 = 254, which fits in __u8. The compressed
header then lands at buf + ((254 + 1) << 3) = buf + 2040, exactly
past the decompressed region (buf[0..2039]). No overlap. 127
segments is well beyond any realistic RPL deployment. |
| Integer overflow in Chromecast in Google Chrome prior to 150.0.7871.182 allowed a local attacker to potentially perform a sandbox escape via malicious network traffic. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| In RtcpFbPacket::decodeRtcpFbPacket, there is a possible out of bounds read due to an integer overflow. This could lead to remote information disclosure with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is needed for exploitation. |
